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Abstract 
 
 General Relativity and the Standard Model often are touted as the most 
rigorously and extensively confirmed scientific hypotheses of all time.  
Nonetheless, these theories appear to have consequences that are inconsistent with 
evidence about phenomena for which, respectively, quantum effects and gravity 
matter.  This paper suggests an explanation for why the theories are not 
disconfirmed by such evidence.  The key to this explanation is an approach to 
scientific hypotheses that allows their actual content to differ from their apparent 
content.  This approach does not appeal to ceteris-paribus qualifiers or 
counterfactuals or similarity relations.  And it helps to explain why some highly 
idealized hypotheses are not treated in the way that a thoroughly refuted theory is 
treated but instead as hypotheses with limited domains of applicability. 
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1.  Introduction 
 General Relativity and the Standard Model of particle physics often are 
touted as the most rigorously and extensively confirmed scientific hypotheses of 
all time.  The general attitude in the scientific community is that the evidence 
available at present confirms these hypotheses to a high degree and that no 
available evidence disconfirms either hypothesis (Shapiro, 1999; Gaillard et al., 
1999).  Nonetheless, General Relativity appears to have consequences that are 
inconsistent with evidence about phenomena for which quantum effects matter.  
For instance, the theory fails to accommodate uncertainty relations between, say, 
position and momentum (Baez, 2001).  The Standard Model, too, seems to have 
consequences that are inconsistent with evidence about phenomena for which 
gravity matters.  For instance, observations of gravitational lenses and the 
deflection of starlight during solar eclipses provide evidence that spacetime is 
curved near massive objects.  But the Standard Model is a quantum field theory 
and, as such, contains the flatness of spacetime as an essential component 
(Hartmann, 1998).   
 If contemporary attitudes toward General Relativity and the Standard 
Model are correct, evidence about phenomena for which quantum effects matter 
does not disconfirm General Relativity and evidence about phenomena for which 
gravitational effects matter does not disconfirm the Standard Model.  This paper 
explores how to accommodate contemporary attitudes toward our current best 
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theories if Confirmation is Local—that is, if an hypothesis' confirmation status 
depends only upon whether the hypothesis, on its own or in conjunction with 
noncompeting auxiliary hypotheses, characterizes phenomena for which evidence 
available.   
 My strategy is as follows.  First, I use an interpretation of Newton's 
attitude toward Kepler's laws of planetary motion in order to motivate and sketch 
an approach to scientific hypotheses that allows their actual content to differ from 
their apparent content, and I show how this approach accommodates 
contemporary attitudes toward General Relativity and the Standard Model if 
Confirmation is Local.  Second, I develop an approach for determining when, and 
in what ways, the actual content of an hypothesis differs from its apparent 
content.  Third, I compare this approach with approaches that invoke ceteris-
paribus qualifiers, counterfactuals, and similarity relations.  I conclude by 
diffusing some potential objections to the new approach and showing that this 
approach works even if confirmation is not local.  My goal is not to address all 
possible objections but rather to present key ideas at a level of detail that makes 
exploring further issues worthwhile to those interested in the confirmation of 
scientific hypotheses. 
 Before proceeding, there are two terminological clarifications to make.  
First, I use the term 'phenomenon' to denote anything that is a fact about the 
physical world.  For instance, the precise shape of Mars' orbit is a phenomenon, 
but the mean average shape of Mars' orbit is a phenomenon too.  And both the 
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exact period of a pendulum and the pendulum's period being within some 
specified range over a given duration are phenomena.  Secondly, in saying that a 
claim characterizes some phenomenon, I do not use the term 'characterize' or its 
cognates as success terms.  That is, I allow a claim to characterize a phenomenon 
even if it incorrectly characterizes that phenomenon. 
 
2.  Apparent content vs. actual content 
 According to one interpretation of Newton's reasoning in Principia, he 
treats Kepler's laws of planetary motion as true and confirmed by available 
evidence, despite knowing of observed deviations from the apparent 
consequences of some of those laws (Forster, 1988, pp. 86-94).  On this 
interpretation, Newton takes the attitude he does toward Kepler's laws because he 
treats those laws as characterizing only the mean average motions of the planets 
rather than their exact motions.  For although Newton's evidence shows that 
Kepler's laws would not correctly characterize the exact motion of planets, the 
possibility of invoking additional sources of gravity in order to explain why exact 
planetary motions deviate from those laws' consequences suggests that they 
correctly identify the actual mean motions of the planets (see Forster, 1988, pp. 
84-85, 89-90).  And if Kepler's laws only characterize mean planetary motions, 
their success in doing so confirms them, and failure to characterize correctly exact 
planetary motions does not impugn the laws' correctness. 
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 Consider, for example, Kepler's statement of his first law in Proposition 5, 
Chapter 3, Book 5 of Harmonices mundi libri: "the orbit of a planet is elliptical, 
and ... the Sun ... is in one of the foci of this ellipse" (as quoted in Stephenson, 
1994, p. 138).  This law appears to characterize not only the mean average shape 
of each planet's orbit but also the exact shape of each orbit: this is the law's 
apparent content, which can be gleaned straightforwardly from the statement of 
the law.  Newton, however, treats this law's actual content as something other 
than its apparent content, even though there is no syntactic indication, in the 
statement of the law, that this is the case.  In particular, Newton treats the law's 
apparent characterization of exact planetary motions as not part of the law's actual 
content, because he treats the actual content of the law as being "Every planet 
travels in an orbit that is, in the mean, an ellipse with the sun at one focus." 
 If this is Newton's attitude toward Kepler's first law, then it is, admittedly, 
somewhat counterintuitive.  After all, the natural interpretation of Kepler's law, 
especially given Kepler's heavy reliance on geometry and the possibility of stating 
the law in mathematical language, is that it characterizes planetary orbits as 
precise, mathematical ellipses.  But perhaps the counterintuitiveness diminishes if 
one keeps in mind that the apparent content of the law is, in part, an artifact of 
using precise mathematical concepts to express the law.  Consider an analogous 
example.  Suppose a bowling ball designer claims, in a patent, that their undrilled 
ball is a sphere.  (See, for example, United States Patent 6569025.)  The apparent 
content of such a claim is that the bowling ball is a precise, mathematical sphere, 
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with all points on its surface equidistant from the ball's center.  Yet the discovery 
of some irregularity on the ball's surface need not cause the designer to retract 
their claim, if the designer's audience understands the actual content to be that, 
say, the bowling ball is, in the mean, a sphere.
1
 
 Nonscientific examples provide further evidence that a claim's actual 
content need not be its apparent content.  Consider a restaurant server's 
explanation of why the money in the cash register for the shift is less than the total 
amount of the receipts for that shift: 
 A ham sandwich left the restaurant without paying.
2
 
The apparent content of this claim is that a ham sandwich left the restaurant and 
did not pay its bill.  The actual content, however, is that a person who ordered a 
ham sandwich left the restaurant without paying the bill.
3
   
                                                 
1 Peter Smith (1998) discusses similar issues, as they pertain to the use of fractal 
structures in characterizing real phenomena like coastline shapes and fern growth.   
2
 This adapts an example originally due to Geoffrey Nunberg (1979). 
3
 The explanation of the relation between a claim's apparent and actual content 
currently is a topic of dispute among philosophers of language that focuses on the 
extent to which semantic content is context sensitive.  (See, for example, the 
symposia on Cappelen and Lepore (2005) in Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, LXXIII(2) and Mind and Language 21(1).)   This dispute is tangential 
to the focus of this paper, since all parties seem to accept that a claim's apparent 
content can differ from its actual content, and since this paper does not propose to 
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 If the actual content of Kepler's first law is not its apparent content 
because the actual content does not characterize exact planetary motions, then, 
despite appearances to the contrary, the derivation of a claim with the actual 
content "Mars' orbit is a mathematical ellipse with the sun at one focus" from 
Kepler's first law is invalid, because the law neither affirms nor denies that all 
planetary orbits are mathematically precise ellipses.  (This is analogous to the 
derivation of "Some ham sandwiches can leave places" from "A ham sandwich 
left the restaurant without paying" being invalid--assuming that the derived claim 
is about ham sandwiches rather than guests who order ham sandwiches.)  
Moreover, there are no relevant auxiliary assumptions that, when conjoined with 
Kepler's first law, render the derivation of that claim valid.  Accordingly, Kepler's 
first law, on its own or in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses, does not 
characterize the shape of Mars' exact orbit.  Hence, if Confirmation is Local, 
evidence about Mars' exact orbit does not disconfirm Kepler's first law. 
 Under this interpretation of Newton's reasoning, Newton's attitude toward 
Kepler's laws resembles contemporary attitudes toward General Relativity and the 
Standard Model, inasmuch as Newton treats Kepler's laws as confirmed despite 
their apparent conflict with available evidence.  Hence, regardless of whether the 
interpretation is correct, the reason it provides for Newton's attitude toward 
Kepler's laws suggests an explanation for the attitudes of contemporary scientists 
                                                                                                                                     
distinguish between the apparent content of scientific hypotheses and their actual 
content on the basis of contextual factors—but more on this in the next section. 
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toward our current best theories: the scientists treat the actual content of these 
theories as being something other than their apparent content, so that General 
Relativity and the Standard Model do not characterize all of the phenomena that 
they seem to characterize--and, in particular, they do not characterize phenomena 
for which quantum and gravitational effects matter, respectively.  Confirmation is 
Local thus entails that neither General Relativity nor the Standard Model is 
disconfirmed by evidence about such phenomena.  For, since the incorrect 
"predictions" of these theories are valid consequences only of their apparent 
content, the theories are not disconfirmed by evidence that shows those 
"predictions" to be incorrect.   
 Consider, by way of illustration, the Standard Model.  It is well known 
that the Standard Model does not account for gravitational interactions between 
particles.  This seems to be why the theory's apparent content incorrectly 
characterizes phenomena for which gravitational effects matter.  The reason that 
the Standard Model does not account for such phenomena is that applying 
quantum field theory (the general framework for the Standard Model) to General 
Relativity yields divergences, such as the claim that the force between gravitons is 
infinite.  (More on the significance of this in the next section.)  Scientists agree 
that such a force is only finite, and yet they generally adopt the attitude that this 
apparent prediction of the Standard Model does not affect the Standard Model's 
confirmation.  An explanation of this attitude is that the scientists treat the 
Standard Model's actual content as something other than its apparent content, so 
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that the theory does not characterize phenomena for which gravitational effects 
matter.  For if this is the case, and if Confirmation is Local, available evidence 
about those phenomena does not impugn the theory's correctness, even though the 
Standard Model appears to characterize such phenomena. 
 Before proceeding to discuss the conditions under which an hypothesis' 
actual content differs from its apparent content, it is important to avoid two 
potential confusions.  The first concerns the justification for postulating a 
distinction between the apparent and actual content of General Relativity and the 
Standard Model.  The example about the ham sandwich illustrates this distinction 
and shows it to be not ad hoc.  The interpretation of Newton illustrates the 
explanatory power of the distinction with respect to a theory's confirmation status.  
None of this, however, justifies the thesis that the actual content of General 
Relativity and the Standard Model differs from their apparent content.  This 
justification, so far, comes from the ability of the thesis, together with certain 
assumptions about confirmation, to explain general scientific attitudes toward the 
confirmation status of General Relativity and the Standard Model. 
 Further justification for this thesis is that the project of accommodating 
contemporary attitudes toward these theories necessitates a distinction between 
the apparent and actual content of General Relativity and the Standard Model, 
regardless of whether Confirmation is Local.  If there is no such difference, each 
theory is disconfirmed in virtue of its incorrect predictions.  For those predictions 
follow from the basic structure of each theory: their derivation requires no 
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auxiliary assumptions.  And, according to any plausible account of confirmation, 
an hypothesis' incorrect predictions disconfirm it whenever the hypothesis, apart 
from any auxiliary assumptions, entails those predictions. 
 A second potential confusion to avoid concerns the difference between a 
theory's range of characterization and its range of application.  If a theory's range 
of application is fixed by scientists' choices about which phenomena to apply the 
theory to, then the claim that General Relativity and the Standard Model do not 
characterize phenomena that would otherwise disconfirm them should not be 
confused with the claim that these theories are limited in their range of 
application.  Certainly scientists do not, in practice, apply these theories to 
phenomena that would disconfirm them.  Yet this does not exclude the theories 
from being disconfirmed by evidence about phenomena outside their range of 
application, because it is consistent with the theories entailing predictions that 
disagree with that evidence and the scientists merely not using those predictions.  
For example, even if scientists do not apply the Standard Model to phenomena for 
which gravitational effects matter, this restriction on the Standard Model's range 
of application is consistent with the Standard Model's actual content entailing 
(incorrect) predictions about such phenomena.   
 Nonetheless, there is a connection between a theory being limited in its 
use-determined range of application and the theory's actual content being 
something other than its apparent content.  For the latter can explain the former: 
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one reason to not apply a theory to certain phenomena is that the theory's actual 
content does not characterize those phenomena.   
 
3.  Determining an hypothesis' actual content 
 The key to the preceding explanation of general scientific attitudes toward 
the confirmation of General Relativity and the Standard Model is that the actual 
content of these theories differs from their apparent content.  This explanation is 
incomplete, however, because it provides no understanding of why each theory's 
actual content differs from its apparent content.  This section presents a novel 
approach to filling this explanatory gap.  I refer to it as a particularist approach to 
the content of scientific hypotheses, because it is committed to the idea that the 
conditions for determining an hypothesis' actual content give verdicts about that 
content on a phenomenon-by-phenomenon basis.  This differs from other 
approaches, such as ones that invoke ceteris-paribus qualifiers or counterfactuals, 
that determine an hypothesis' actual content through principles that add logical 
structure to the hypothesis' apparent content--but more on this in the next section.  
Accordingly, the particularist approach here is akin to particularist approaches in 
ethics, which determine the rightness or wrongness of actions on a case-by-case 
basis rather than by appeal to general abstract principles, and which are driven by 
analysis of case studies rather than application of theory.  (See Arras (2004) for a 
concise overview of the particularist approach in ethics.) 
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 My strategy in presenting a particularist approach to the content of 
scientific hypotheses is to propose two conditions for determining when, and in 
what way, an hypothesis' actual content differs from its apparent content.  The 
approach does not stand or fall with the correctness of these conditions: the 
conditions themselves are starting points in a research program for further 
refining these conditions (if need be) and discovering others (if they exist).  The 
approach itself, while independent of these specific conditions, is committed to 
only the existence of some condition that explains why nonrational paradigm 
entrenchment does not (arbitrarily) determine the actual content of scientific 
hypotheses, and that does so without adding logical structure to the apparent 
content of hypotheses.   
 The distinctive feature of a particularist approach to the content of 
scientific hypotheses is that it is a "bottom-up," rather than "top-down," approach.  
Rather than postulating additional structure as part of an hypothesis' actual 
content and proceeding to deduce which phenomena the hypothesis' actual 
content characterizes, a particularist approach examines individual cases in which 
some hypothesis' actual content differs from its apparent content and generalizes 
to conditions for determining any hypothesis' actual content.  Accordingly, in 
presenting a particularist approach to the content of scientific hypotheses, I begin 
with some brief case studies. 
 The case of Coulomb's law suggests that sometimes the actual content of 
an hypothesis differs from its apparent content because the hypothesis' apparent 
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content yields a divergence.  Coulomb's law is a consequence of the foundational 
equations of Classical Electromagnetism and, specifically, of Gauss' law for 
electricity.  The law states that the strength of the force between any two charged 
particles is proportional to the product of each particle's charge strength divided 
by the square of the distance between the particles.  Using Coulomb's law, it can 
be shown that the electric field of a negatively charged particle (electron), defined 
as the force that the particle exerts on a positive test charge, is inversely 
proportional to the square of the distance between the electron and the test charge.  
It follows that the strength of an electron's electric field increases as the electron 
approaches any negative charge.  This raises the question of how strong the 
electron's electric field is at the location of the electron.  That is: when an electron 
interacts with its own electric field, what force does the electron exert upon itself? 
 Classical Electromagnetism, like Classical Newtonian Mechanics, treats 
objects as particles with zero diameter.  Hence, since the theory treats electrons as 
point charges, the distance between an electron and itself is zero when the 
electron interacts with its own electric field.  (If the electron's diameter were 
nonzero, it would be possible for the electron to interact with different parts of 
itself; but this raises a problem about the stability of self-interacting, extended 
electrons.)  Accordingly, Coulomb's law entails that the strength of an electron's 
field at the location of the electron diverges to infinity.  (When an hypothesis 
yields this sort of result, I say that the hypothesis yields a divergence.)  A typical 
response to this result is to ignore this divergence, on the grounds that the range of 
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application for Coulomb's law--and Classical Electromagnetism--does not include 
the strength of an electron's electric field when the distance between the electron 
and the particle with which it interacts is zero.  An explanation for this restriction 
is that the law's actual content does not characterize the strength of an electron's 
electric field when the distance between the electron and the particle with which it 
interacts is zero.  If this is correct, then a divergence in one of an hypothesis' 
apparent claims can indicate that the hypothesis' actual content differs from its 
apparent content.   
 However, an hypothesis' apparent content yielding a divergence does not 
always indicate this.  Consider the Ising model's characterization of 
ferromagnetic-paramagnetic phase transitions in metals.  When a system 
characterized by the Ising model approaches its Curie temperature, the system's 
heat capacity diverges logarithmically.  But the typical response to this result is 
not to ignore the divergence on the grounds that the Ising model does not 
characterize or apply to a system's heat capacity when the system is at its Curie 
temperature.  Rather, the typical response is to treat the divergence as indicating 
the occurrence of a phase transition at which, in actual fact, the system's heat 
capacity is singular.  Indeed, the ability of the Ising model to predict this 
divergence is among the model's most attractive features.   
 What seems to account for the difference in attitude toward Coulomb's law 
and the Ising model is that scientists consider the divergence in the latter to 
represent a real phenomenon while they consider the divergence in the former as 
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merely a mathematical artifact that does not represent anything.  This suggests the 
following condition for when, and in what way, the actual content of an 
hypothesis differs from its apparent content: 
 DIVERGENCE: If the apparent content of an hypothesis entails a prediction 
about some phenomenon, according to which the 
magnitude of some quantity diverges, and if the hypothesis 
is not part of a theory that represents that phenomenon as a 
singularity, then the actual content of the hypothesis does 
not characterize that phenomenon. 
The apparent content of Coulomb's law entails a prediction about an electron's 
electric field at the location of the (point-mass) electron, according to which the 
strength of the electron's electric field diverges; and Classical Electromagnetism--
the theory of which Coulomb's law is a part--does not represent any real 
phenomenon as a singularity at the location of an electron.  Hence, according to 
DIVERGENCE, the actual content of Coulomb's law does not characterize the 
strength of an electron's electric field at the location of the electron.  In contrast, 
the apparent content of the Ising model entails a prediction about a system's heat 
capacity at its Curie temperature, according to which the system's heat capacity 
diverges at that temperature; and Statistical Mechanics--the theory of which the 
Ising model is a part--represents phase transitions as singularities.  Hence, the 
actual content of the Ising model characterizing a system's heat capacity at its 
Curie temperature is consistent with DIVERGENCE.   
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 DIVERGENCE helps to explain why the Standard Model's actual content 
differs from its apparent content.  The apparent content of the Standard Model 
entails predictions about phenomena for which gravitational effects matter; these 
predictions are divergences (such as the claim that the force between gravitons is 
infinite); and the Standard Model, not being part of any other theory, does not 
represent any such phenomena as singularities.  Hence, according to 
DIVERGENCE, the actual content of the Standard Model does not characterize 
phenomena for which gravitational effects matter.   
  The case of Nonrelativistic Newtonian Mechanics suggests a second 
reason why an hypothesis' actual content differs from its apparent content, 
namely, that predictions derived from the hypothesis' apparent content disagree 
with experimental evidence.  Nonrelativistic Newtonian Mechanics seems to 
entail predictions that disagree with evidence about quantum and relativistic 
phenomena.  For this reason, scientists do not apply the theory to such 
phenomena.  Nonetheless, scientists continue to apply the theory to phenomena 
that involve slow-moving, medium-sized objects, placing great confidence in the 
theory's reliability for these phenomena.  Indeed, the general scientific attitude 
seems to be that the theory is confirmed by evidence about such phenomena, and 
this demands that the theory not be disconfirmed in an absolute sense by evidence 
about quantum and relativistic phenomena.  An explanation of this is that 
scientists treat the theory's actual content as something other than its apparent 
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content.  If this is correct, then the incorrect predictions are consequences of the 
theory's apparent content but not its actual content. 
 However, it is not always the case that disagreement between 
experimental evidence and the predictions of an hypothesis' apparent content 
indicate that the hypothesis' actual content differs from its apparent content.  
Consider phlogiston theory.  The theory seems to predict (incorrectly) that 
phosphorus and sulfur, when burned, lose some of their weight.  In practice, 
scientists do not apply this theory to the burning of sulfur and phosphorus.  Yet 
neither the incorrect prediction from the theory's apparent content nor the 
limitation on the theory's range of application indicate that the theory's actual 
content does not entail that phosphorus and sulfur, when burned, lose some of 
their weight, because the theory is taken to be disconfirmed by this prediction 
(among others).  In this case, perhaps the explanation of why scientists do not 
apply phlogiston theory to the burning of sulfur and phosphorus is that the theory 
is disconfirmed (in an absolute sense) in virtue of the incorrect prediction being a 
consequence of its actual content: presumably some disconfirmed theories have 
no range of application.   
 Any condition that explains why scientists have differing attitudes toward 
Nonrelativistic Newtonian Mechanics and phlogiston theory should satisfy the 
following desiderata.  First, it should not entail that phlogiston theory's actual 
content does not characterize what happens to phosphorus and sulfur when they 
are burned.  Second, it should entail that the actual content of Nonrelativistic 
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Newtonian Mechanics does not characterize phenomena for which quantum and 
relativistic effects matter.  Finally, it should entail that the actual content of 
General Relativity and the Standard Model do not characterize, respectively, 
phenomena for which quantum and gravitational effects matter.  The following 
condition satisfies all of these requirements: 
 DIFFERENCE: If an hypothesis distorts the magnitude of a physical 
quantity that makes a difference to a phenomenon and the 
hypothesis's apparent content incorrectly characterizes that 
phenomenon, then the actual content of the hypothesis does 
not characterize that phenomenon.   
This condition appeals to several notions that require further elucidation, namely, 
the notion of an hypothesis distorting some factor and of a factor making a 
difference to a phenomenon.   
 An hypothesis distorts the magnitude of a physical quantity by treating 
that quantity as having a magnitude it does not have.  For example, in discussing 
the prospects for a quantum theory of gravity, John Baez (2001) remarks that 
General Relativity "idealizes reality by treating [Planck's constant] as negligibly 
small" and that Quantum Field Theory idealizes reality by treating Newton's 
gravitational constant as negligibly small (p. 182).  These idealizations are 
distortions, in virtue of those constants not being negligibly small.  Similarly, 
Nonrelativistic Newtonian Mechanics distorts reality by treating Planck's constant 
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as negligibly small and the speed of light as having no upper limit; and Classical 
Electromagnetism distorts the size of electrons by treating them as point-particles.   
 One account of the notion of distortion appeals to what the semantic view 
of scientific theories calls a theoretical model for an hypothesis.  This is a 
nonactual (and perhaps abstract) entity of which the apparent content of the 
hypothesis is exactly and correctly true (see Giere, 1988, pp. 78-80).  For 
example, a theoretical model for the ideal gas law is an ideal gas in which there 
are no intermolecular forces; and the theoretical model for the Standard Model 
includes a Minkowski spacetime that serves as the fixed background on which 
particle interactions occur (because the Standard Model is a quantum field 
theory).  This notion of a theoretical model figures in the following condition for 
when an hypothesis distorts: 
 DISTORT: An hypothesis distorts the magnitude of a physical quantity 
if the theoretical model for the hypothesis is one in which 
that physical quantity has a magnitude that it does not have 
in reality.   
(If there are multiple theoretical models for the same hypothesis, then the 
magnitude should be incorrect in every such model.)  According to DISTORT, the 
Standard Model distorts the magnitude of Newton's gravitational constant because 
that constant is negligibly small in the Standard Model's theoretical model but not 
in reality; and General Relativity distorts the magnitude of Planck's constant 
because that constant is negligibly small in General Relativity's theoretical model 
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but not in reality.  (Note that DISTORT does not require that anyone be aware that 
an hypothesis distorts the magnitude of some quantity in order for the hypothesis 
to distort that quantity: in this sense, it is an externalist criterion.  Note also that 
DISTORT does not require a distorted magnitude to be approximately correct or an 
idealization: distortions need not be approximations or simplifications.) 
 The notion of difference-making that appears in DIFFERENCE is more 
difficult to explain, primarily because of the wide variety of accounts available 
and the lack of consensus as to which of the available accounts is best.  (See 
Strevens (2004) for a nice summary of various accounts of difference-making.)  
In order for DIFFERENCE to satisfy the preceding desiderata, the following claims 
must be true: a finite upper bound on the speed of light makes a difference to 
phenomena for which relativistic effects matter; a finite, nonzero, nonnegligible 
gravitational constant makes a difference to the affect of matter fields on the 
underlying structure of spacetime; and a finite, nonzero, nonnegligible Planck's 
constant makes a difference to gravitational lensing (and other phenomena for 
which gravitational effects matter).  These claims generally are not considered to 
be problematic.  And their acceptability here does not require support from a 
rigorous philosophical analysis of the notion of difference-making.  For, given 
their prima-facie plausibility, they are evidence that philosophical analyses should 
accommodate.
4
  
                                                 
4 In any case, it is relatively easy to show that the main competing accounts of 
difference-making support these claims.  For instance, if a factor makes a 
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 If these facts about difference-making are granted, then DIFFERENCE 
satisfies all of the required conditions.  Since the Standard Model distorts the 
magnitude of Newton's gravitational constant but the actual value of this constant 
makes a difference to gravitational lensing and other such phenomena, and since 
the Standard Model's apparent content incorrectly characterizes such phenomena, 
DIFFERENCE entails that the Standard Model's actual content does not characterize 
those phenomena.  Similar reasoning shows that General Relativity's actual 
content does not characterize phenomena for which quantum effects matter and 
that the actual content of Nonrelativistic Newtonian Mechanics does not 
characterize phenomena for which quantum and relativistic effects matter.  
Finally, although the theoretical model for phlogiston theory includes nonexistent 
entities (namely, phlogiston), this feature of the model does not involve 
attributing a nonactual magnitude to some physical quantity.  Hence, phlogiston 
theory does not distort the magnitude of any quantity that makes a difference to 
the behavior of phosphorus and sulfur when burned and, accordingly, DIFFERENCE 
is consistent with phlogiston theory characterizing such phenomena.   
                                                                                                                                     
difference to a phenomenon just when the factor changes the probability for the 
phenomenon's occurrence, then a nonnegligible gravitational constant makes a 
difference to the affect of matter fields on the underlying structure of spacetime, 
because the probability of spacetime being flat if that constant is negligibly small 
is greater than the probability of spacetime being flat if the constant is not 
negligibly small. 
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 One dissatisfying feature of the preceding presentation of a particularist 
approach to the content of scientific hypotheses is that neither DIFFERENCE nor 
DIVERGENCE provide guidance about what an hypothesis' actual content does 
characterize.  The easiest way to remedy this is to introduce a ceteris-paribus 
condition: 
 DEFAULT: An hypothesis' actual content characterizes a phenomenon 
if its apparent content does, unless DIVERGENCE, 
DIFFERENCE, or some other such condition entails 
otherwise. 
If there are no conditions other than DIVERGENCE and DIFFERENCE, then DEFAULT 
entails, among other things, that phlogiston theory's actual content characterizes 
the behavior of phosphorus and sulfur when burned, that the Standard Model's 
actual content characterizes certain quantum phenomena, and that the actual 
content of Kepler's first law characterizes the mean orbits of the planets.   
 To summarize the discussion so far: General Relativity and the Standard 
Model are not disconfirmed by evidence about phenomena for which, 
respectively, quantum and gravitational effects matter, because the theories do not 
characterize those phenomena.  According to the preceding particularist approach 
to the content of scientific hypotheses, conditions like DIVERGENCE, DIFFERENCE, 
and DEFAULT explain why this is so, because they determine what an hypothesis' 
actual content is and when that content differs from the hypothesis' apparent 
content.  And even if these conditions are incorrect, they illustrate a general 
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strategy for explaining why an hypothesis' actual content differs from its apparent 
content.   
 
4.  Other approaches to the content of scientific hypotheses 
 The preceding particularist approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses resembles approaches to scientific hypotheses that treat them as 
ceteris-paribus claims or counterfactuals or approximations.  These other 
approaches also entail that an hypothesis' actual content can differ from its 
apparent content, insofar as many scientific hypotheses do not contain explicit 
ceteris-paribus qualifiers, are not stated as counterfactuals, and are not explicitly 
qualified as being approximations.  The difference between these approaches and 
the particularist approach concerns the conditions about what determines the 
actual content of an hypothesis.  (The particularist approach also avoids some of 
the traditional problems that beset the alternatives; but, apart from a brief 
discussion in the next section, exploring this issue is beyond this paper's scope.) 
 
4.1.  The ceteris-paribus approach 
 According to the ceteris-paribus approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses, the actual content of an hypothesis is its apparent content affixed with 
a ceteris-paribus qualifier.  (See Lange (2002) for a defense of this approach.)  
For instance, as a ceteris-paribus hypothesis, the generic law "Every F is a G" has 
the actual content "Every F is a G, ceteris paribus"--that is, "Every F is a G, 
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unless there is some factor that interferes with an F being a G."  And, as a ceteris-
paribus hypothesis, the actual content of Kepler's first law is: "Each planet's orbit 
is a mathematically precise ellipse with the sun at one foci, unless certain factors, 
such as the gravitational pull from other planets, interfere with a planet's orbit."   
 Ceteris-paribus hypotheses only characterize phenomena that occur when 
interfering factors are absent.  For instance, if I is some factor that interferes with 
whether Fs are Gs and I occurs in some system that contains an F, then the claim 
"Every F is a G, ceteris paribus" entails neither that the F in the system is a G nor 
that the F is not a G.  Likewise, as a ceteris-paribus hypothesis, the actual content 
of Kepler's first law is: "Each planet's orbit is a precise, mathematical ellipse, 
unless there is a factor that interferes with this."  This does not characterize the 
orbital shapes of actual planets, because gravitational effects interfere with those 
orbits being precise ellipses.  If an interfering factor occurs in some system, then a 
ceteris-paribus hypothesis makes no claims about the system, even if its apparent 
content does. 
 According to the particularist approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses, the actual content of an hypothesis need not characterize only 
phenomena that occur when interfering factors are absent.  For example, 
according to the particularist approach developed in the previous section, since 
Kepler's first law distorts the magnitude of interplanetary gravitational forces and 
this makes a difference to actual, exact planetary orbits, the actual content of 
Kepler's first law does not characterize exact planetary orbits.  This agrees with 
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the ceteris-paribus approach.  But since, according to that approach, the ceteris-
paribus qualifier is built into the law's actual content, the actual content of 
Kepler's first law does not characterize any phenomena concerning actual planets, 
because interfering factors always are present.  The particularist approach can 
avoid this further result.  For that approach allows the actual content of Kepler's 
first law to characterize mean planetary orbits even when gravitational forces are 
present, provided that conditions like DIVERGENCE and DIFFERENCE do not entail 
otherwise.  And there seems to be no a priori reason that there must be conditions 
that restrict the law's actual content to the same extent as the ceteris-paribus 
approach does.   
 Accordingly, the particularist approach can allow the actual content of an 
hypothesis to characterize a phenomenon that, according to the ceteris-paribus 
approach, the hypothesis' actual content does not characterize.  The central reason 
for this is that the particularist approach does not add logical structure to the 
actual content of hypotheses.  Determining actual content on a phenomenon-by-
phenomenon basis avoids the need to do this.   
 
4.2.  The counterfactual approach 
 According to the counterfactual approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses, the actual content of an hypothesis is a counterfactual, the consequent 
of which is the apparent content of the hypothesis and the antecedent of which is 
the conjunction of the distortions upon which that description is based.  (See 
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Niiniluoto (1986) and Suppe (1989) for examples of this approach.)  For instance, 
if the ideal gas law is a counterfactual hypothesis, then its actual content is: "If the 
components of a gas were point-particles that interact only by contact, then the 
product of the gas' pressure and volume would be equal to the product of the gas' 
particle number and temperature times a proportionality constant."  Evidence that 
the equality in the consequent fails to hold of dense gases does not disconfirm this 
counterfactual hypothesis, insofar as such gases do not instantiate the 
counterfactual's antecedent.   
 Counterfactual hypotheses characterize only the counterfactual structure 
of the world.  For instance, as counterfactuals, the ideal gas law characterizes only 
how a gas would behave were it an ideal gas and the Standard Model 
characterizes only how particles would behave if Newton's gravitational constant 
were negligible.  Of course, sometimes the antecedent of a counterfactual 
hypothesis is realized fortuitously or in the construction of experimental 
situations.  When this happens, counterfactual hypotheses make claims about the 
actual structure of the world, because the world's actual structure coincides with 
its counterfactual structure.  But these situations are exceptional.   
 According to the particularist approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses, the actual content of an hypothesis need not characterize only the 
counterfactual structure of the world.  Consider, for example, Mercury's 
anomalous precession and the expansion rate of the universe.  These are not 
counterfactual features of the world.  Nor do they obtain only in ideal systems for 
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which Planck's constant is negligibly small.  But, provided that the actual content 
of General Relativity's Einstein equation characterizes systems other than those in 
which Planck's constant is negligible, they are phenomena that General Relativity 
characterizes.  Indeed, the attitude of practicing scientists seems to be that General 
Relativity's actual content characterizes such phenomena, and neither 
DIVERGENCE nor DIFFERENCE tell against this attitude.   
 The central reason that the particularist approach allows hypotheses to 
have actual content that characterizes the noncounterfactual structure of the actual 
world is the same as the reason for why the approach allows hypotheses to have 
actual content that characterizes phenomena that occur when interfering factors 
are present: the approach does not introduce logical structure into an hypothesis' 
actual content that is not present in the hypothesis' apparent content.  According 
to the counterfactual approach, the actual content of an hypothesis is a 
counterfactual, even if the hypothesis' apparent content is not.  Since the 
particularist approach does not require introducing this logical apparatus, it allows 
hypotheses to have actual content that characterizes the world in a way that is not 
conditional upon the realization of a set of counterfactual assumptions.   
 
4.3.  The approximation approach 
 According to the approximation approach, scientific hypotheses do not 
precisely characterize the world.  Rather, they provide approximate 
characterizations of the way the world is.  (See Weston (1992) for an example.)  
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For instance, according to this approach, the actual content of the ideal gas law is: 
"It is approximately the case that the product of a gas' pressure and volume is 
equal to the product of that gas' particle number and temperature times a 
proportionality constant."  The key advantage of approximate hypotheses over 
their precisely-construed counterparts is that the former need not be disconfirmed 
by evidence that is inconsistent with the latter.  Another advantage is that 
approximate hypotheses need not characterize only counterfactual features of the 
real world, because approximations need not be counterfactuals: approximations 
can, and often do, characterize (approximately) some noncounterfactual features 
of the real world.  Finally, approximate hypotheses, unlike ceteris-paribus ones, 
can characterize systems in which interfering factors are present. 
 Comparing this approach to the content of scientific hypotheses with the 
particularist approach from the preceding section faces the difficulty that there is 
no general agreement on how to construe the notion of approximation.  There is 
debate about whether the notion of approximation is absolute or context-
dependent.  And there is uncertainty about the conditions under which an 
hypothesis approximates the evidence.   
 The difficulties in taking approximation to be context-independent include 
the problem of there being no nonarbitrary standard that determines whether an 
hypothesis approximates the evidence in an absolute sense, the problem that the 
approximate truth (in an absolute sense) of two hypotheses need not transfer to 
their conjunction being approximately true, and the problem that whether an 
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hypothesis approximates the evidence in an absolute sense seems to depend upon 
the language in which the hypothesis is cast.  (See Teller (2001, pp. 402-406) and 
Giere (2006, pp. 59-82) for details and elaborations.)  These problems suggest 
that the only coherent notion of approximation (if there is one at all) is context-
dependent.   
 Paul Teller's (2001) claim that "talk about approximate truth comes down 
to the same issues as those covered by talk of the similarity between models and 
their objects of representation" (p. 404) represents the dominant--and currently 
most plausible--account of context-dependent approximation.  This account relies 
upon a particular version of the semantic view of scientific theories.  So it will be 
useful to sketch that view before presenting the account. 
 According to what I shall call the agent-based conception of theories 
(following Giere (forthcoming)), the actual content of a scientific hypothesis is a 
claim that a certain abstract model is similar to the world in relevant respects and 
to relevant degrees of accuracy.  This abstract model, itself neither true nor false 
in virtue of being nonlinguistic, is a system of which the apparent content of the 
scientific hypothesis--such as Kepler's first law or the ideal gas law--is exactly 
and correctly true.  For instance, the abstract model for the ideal gas law is a 
nonactual gas composed of point-particles that, among other things, affect each 
other only through perfectly elastic collisions.  The actual content of the ideal gas 
law is not its apparent content ("The product of a gas' pressure and volume is 
equal to the product of that gas' particle number and temperature times a 
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proportionality constant") but rather the claim that the hypothesis' abstract model 
is similar to the actual world in relevant respects and degrees.   
 What determines which respects and degrees of the world are relevant to 
any given model-world pair's similarity is not some general principle, according 
to this conception of theories, but instead the purposes for which scientists intend 
to use the model.  For example, if scientists intend to use the ideal gas model for 
the purpose of determining whether the pressure and volume of real gases at fixed 
temperatures in closed environments exhibit a rough, qualitative, inverse 
proportionality (so that the pressure increases just when the volume decreases), 
then the ideal gas law is true just if this feature of ideal gases occurs in actual 
gases, regardless of whether the ideal gas law's precise details about the 
proportion match the details for actual gases.  Similarly, if scientists intend to use 
Kepler's first law only for predicting the mean orbits of the planets, then the orbits 
of the abstract model for that law are similar to actual planetary orbits, even 
though the actual planets exhibit slight variations in each of their successive orbits 
but the planets of the abstract model do not.
5
 
                                                 
5 The preceding sketch of the agent-based conception of scientific theories 
introduces terminology--such as the notions of actual and apparent content--that 
advocates of the conception do not employ.  This is for the sake of facilitating 
comparison with the previous section's approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses.  See Giere (1988), Giere (forthcoming), and Teller (2001) for further 
details on this conception of theories.  
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 The agent-based conception of scientific theories explicates the notion of 
approximation in terms of similarity: an hypothesis is approximately true just if 
the hypothesis' abstract model is similar to the world in relevant respects and 
degrees.  Teller (2001), for example, holds that asking whether a statement 
warrants the title of being approximately true of a situation is the same as asking 
whether the statement describes a nonactual situation that is relevantly similar to 
the actual one (p. 403).  This explication of the notion of approximation allows an 
hypothesis to be approximately true even if some predictions of its apparent 
content are incorrect.  Moreover, this explication accommodates the demand that 
the notion of approximation be context-dependent.  For contextual purposes help 
to determine the actual content of an hypothesis: if context alters these purposes, 
there can be a corresponding alteration in whether the hypothesis is approximately 
true.  For example, were scientists to use the ideal gas model for the intended 
purpose of predicting exact behaviors of dense gases, the ideal gas law would not 
be approximately true.   
 This sketch of the approximation approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses, itself motivated by the agent-based conception of scientific theories, 
provides sufficient detail to show that this approach is an instance of a 
particularist approach.  For it determines an hypothesis' actual content on a 
phenomenon-by-phenomenon basis, namely, on the basis of whether the intended 
purpose of the hypothesis' abstract model requires that model to be similar to the 
world with respect to a particular phenomenon.   
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 This approach differs from the particularist approach of the preceding 
section in virtue of the kinds of conditions it provides for determining an 
hypothesis' actual content.  According to the approximation approach, the 
conditions are teleological (purpose-determined).  The approach in the preceding 
section shows that particularist approaches to the content of scientific hypotheses 
need not be teleological, for the conditions there make no reference to the 
purposes of scientists.  That approach--which I shall refer to as nonteleological--
also shows that a particularist approach need not invoke the notion of similarity.  
For example, if a quantity makes a difference to a phenomenon whenever its 
presence affects the probability of a phenomenon's occurrence, then whether a 
quantity makes a difference to a phenomenon does not depend upon the existence 
of appropriate sorts of similarity relations.   
 These differences are significant.  The first signals a fundamental 
disagreement about whether the confirmation status of an hypothesis depends in 
any way upon the purposes for which scientists use it.  According to the 
approximation approach, whether an hypothesis' actual content characterizes 
certain phenomena depends upon the purposes for which scientists use the 
hypothesis; hence, whether evidence about those phenomena confirms or 
disconfirms the hypothesis depends upon those purposes.  In contrast, the 
nonteleological approach allows an hypothesis' confirmation status to be purpose-
independent, since reference to scientists' purposes is not essential to explications 
of difference-making and other notions central to the approach.   
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 The second difference marks conflicting attitudes toward the theoretical 
promise of the notion of similarity.  Progress in clarifying this notion mainly 
concerns a comparative notion of whether the similarity between two things is 
more or less than the similarity between one of those things and some third thing.  
(See, for example, Gärdenfors (1990) and (2000).)  But the approximation 
approach requires a noncomparative notion of similarity between theoretical 
models and the world, and there recently has been more progress in clarifying the 
notion of difference-making than there has been in clarifying a noncomparative 
notion of similarity.  (See, for example, Pearl (2000) and Strevens (2004).)  
Perhaps this is a virtue of the nonteleological approach. 
 It is possible, of course, that the approximation and nonteleological 
approaches agree perfectly concerning whether, for any given hypothesis, the 
hypothesis' actual content characterizes a certain phenomenon.  Ideally, scientists 
intend to use an abstract model to characterize exactly those phenomena that, 
according to the nonteleological approach, the actual content of the model's 
hypothesis characterizes.  But there is nothing in the agent-based conception of 
scientific theories that requires scientists to do this: scientists are, according to 
that conception (as it has been presented by others), unconstrained in the purposes 
for which they intend to use abstract models.  Accordingly, when these two 
approaches to the content of scientific hypotheses agree on what the actual 
content of a particular hypothesis characterizes, that agreement is contingent 
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rather than a consequence of one approach merely being a restatement of the 
other.   
 
5.  Objections 
 Any approach to the content of scientific hypotheses should avoid three 
canonical problems.  First, the approach should not entail that distorted 
hypotheses--that is, hypotheses that distort certain factors of real systems--
characterize almost no actual phenomena; second, it should explain why scientists 
are justified in applying distorted hypotheses to actual systems; and third, it 
should permit distorted hypotheses to be falsified or disconfirmed by evidence.  
Sheldon Smith (2002) illustrates these problems in his criticism of the ceteris-
paribus approach (pp. 235-237).  He argues that the approach succumbs to the 
problem of instantiation: ceteris-paribus hypotheses characterize almost nothing 
actual because interfering factors normally occur in actual systems.  He argues 
that the approach succumbs to the problem of application: scientists are not 
justified in applying these hypotheses to systems in which interfering factors are 
present because the hypotheses do not characterize those systems.  And he argues 
that the approach succumbs to the problem of falsification: the ceteris-paribus 
qualifier immunizes ceteris-paribus hypotheses from falsification and 
disconfirmation because any apparent disagreement with evidence indicates the 
presence of an interfering factor. 
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 The nonteleological particularist approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses avoids all three of these problems.  First, it already has been shown 
that the nonteleological approach allows hypotheses to have actual content that 
characterizes phenomena that occur when interfering factors are present as well as 
noncounterfactual features of the actual world.  This solves the problem of 
instantiation.  Second, the approach avoids the problem of application, since 
scientists surely are justified in applying an hypothesis to a system when the 
hypothesis' actual content characterizes phenomena in that system (unless, of 
course, disconfirmation of the hypothesis defeats that justification).   
 Avoiding the problem of falsification requires that the approach allow 
some hypotheses to incorrectly characterize some phenomena.  The approach 
does this.  If an hypothesis characterizes some phenomenon then, according to 
DIVERGENCE and DIFFERENCE, both of the following disjunctions are true: either 
the apparent content of the hypothesis entails the hypothesis is part of a theory 
that represents that phenomenon as a singularity or the hypothesis entails a 
prediction about that phenomenon according to which the magnitude of some 
quantity diverges; and either the hypothesis does not incorrectly characterize the 
phenomenon or the hypothesis does not distort the magnitude of some quantity 
that makes a difference to the phenomenon.   
 The case of phlogiston theory satisfies the second disjunct of both of these 
disjunctions for the phenomenon of sulfur weighing more after it is burned.  So, 
according to DEFAULT, phlogiston theory's actual content characterizes this 
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phenomenon.  And this characterization is incorrect.  (Incidentally, if there are 
conditions other than DIVERGENCE and DIFFERENCE that determine whether an 
hypothesis's actual content characterizes a phenomenon, the requirement that the 
approach avoid the problem of falsification translates into a constraint that these 
further conditions not override the verdict that phlogiston theory's actual content 
incorrectly characterizes some phenomena.  This constraint sets an agenda for a 
research program that extracts from scientific attitudes further conditions for 
determining whether the actual content of an hypothesis characterizes some 
phenomenon, and that perhaps further refines DIVERGENCE and DIFFERENCE.) 
 Having addressed the standard set of potential objections for various 
approaches to the content of scientific hypothesis, I consider two objections based 
upon the specific details of the nonteleological approach.  The first is based upon 
the approach's consequence that (for instance) the ideal gas law is not 
disconfirmed by evidence about the behaviors of dense gases.  For, according to 
DIFFERENCE, since the ideal gas law distorts the extension and intermolecular 
interactions of a gas' constituents and these factors apparently make a difference 
to the behavior of dense gases, the actual content of the ideal gas law does not 
characterize those behaviors.  This result violates the intuition that such evidence 
disconfirms the ideal gas law (if Confirmation is Local).  Hence, according to the 
objection, even if the approach succeeds in accommodating general attitudes 
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toward General Relativity and the Standard Model, it succumbs to straightforward 
counterexamples.
6
 
 However, there is some reason to think that the objection's guiding 
intuition is mistaken.  The (admittedly few) working scientists with whom I have 
spoken report that they do not take the ideal gas law to be disconfirmed by 
available evidence because the hypothesis has a limited range of application.  
They report similar attitudes toward Kepler's and Newton's laws.  The conception 
of confirmation that underlies these attitudes seems to involve exempting 
hypotheses from disconfirmation by evidence about phenomena to which they do 
not apply.  This is exactly what the nonteleological particularist approach does, 
assuming that hypotheses apply only to the phenomena they characterize.  Hence, 
it is prima-facie reasonable to conclude that the approach captures attitudes 
toward confirmation that are implicit in scientific practice and methodology, 
despite intuitions to the contrary. 
 A second potentially objectionable consequence of the nonteleological 
approach is that it is possible for the inventors or practitioners of an hypothesis to 
not know what the hypothesis' actual content is.  This is a result of the 
DIFFERENCE condition making no reference to scientists' knowledge of what 
factors an hypothesis distorts and whether those factors make a difference to 
various phenomena.  For example, suppose that in formulating his first law of 
planetary motion, Kepler did not know that law distorts something that makes a 
                                                 
6 I thank [omitted] for pressing this objection. 
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difference to exact planetary motions.  Then, even if Kepler believed his law to 
characterize exact planetary motions, DIFFERENCE entails that he was mistaken.  
According to this objection, such a result is implausible. 
 There are two ways of responding to this objection and, for the purposes 
of this paper, either is equally good.  The first is to bite the bullet and insist that 
scientists can be mistaken in what they take an hypothesis to characterize.  For 
example, according to this approach, Kepler just did not know the actual content 
of his first law, and Newton did not know that the actual content of his laws 
characterize only medium-sized objects moving significantly slower than light 
speed.  The second strategy is to concede the force of the objection and modify 
conditions like DIVERGENCE and DIFFERENCE so that they are sensitive to the state 
of scientific knowledge concerning whether an hypothesis distorts a difference-
maker for a phenomenon.  For instance, according to this strategy, DIFFERENCE 
should begin "If it is known that an hypothesis distorts the magnitude of a 
quantity that makes a difference to a phenomenon, ...."  This second strategy 
entails that an hypothesis' actual content--and its confirmation status--can vary 
over time, due to changes in scientific knowledge.  In contrast, the first strategy 
entails that an hypothesis' actual content--and its confirmation status--is invariant 
with respect to such changes and treats advances in knowledge of what 
hypotheses distort as evidence that allows scientists to better understand the actual 
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content of those hypotheses.  Which strategy is most appropriate depends upon 
issues about meaning and confirmation that are best addressed elsewhere.
7
   
 
6.  Conclusion 
 A nonteleological particularist approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses accommodates contemporary attitudes toward the confirmation status 
of General Relativity and the Standard Model.  This is true even if confirmation is 
not local and the confirmation status of an hypothesis can depend upon the 
empirical content of competing hypotheses.  Consider, for example, the Standard 
Model's confirmation status if Bayesian confirmation theory is correct.  If the 
Standard Model's actual content is the same as its apparent content, the likelihood 
of the Standard Model relative to evidence about spacetime's nonzero curvature is 
zero, since the Standard Model predicts, all on its own, that spacetime is flat.  
Hence, if the Standard Model's actual content does not differ from its apparent 
content, Bayesianism entails that available evidence disconfirms the Standard 
Model, contrary to the general attitude of the scientific community.   
 Of course, accommodating this attitude requires Bayesians to take into 
account the confirmation status of the Standard Model's competitors in addition to 
distinguishing the Standard Model's actual content from its apparent content.  It 
                                                 
7 But see, for example, Michael Strevens' "Ceteris Paribus Hedges: Causal 
Voodoo That Works" (unpublished manuscript) for arguments that favor the first 
strategy. 
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seems plausible that no such competitor disconfirms the Standard Model in virtue 
of correctly characterizing some available evidence that the Standard Model does 
not.  (General Relativity's predictions about spacetime curvature and other large-
scale phenomena need not make General Relativity a competitor to the Standard 
Model, insofar as the Standard Model's actual content does not characterize those 
phenomena.)  Establishing this, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.  Here 
it suffices to note that doing so is possible insofar as Bayesianism is correct.  For 
this shows that a nonteleological particularist approach to the content of scientific 
hypotheses can accommodate contemporary attitudes toward the confirmation 
status of the Standard Model even if confirmation is not local. 
 This approach does not address all the concerns about the confirmation of 
scientific hypotheses when distortions are involved.  For instance, it does not 
address the apparent fact that confirming evidence often is idealized, due to the 
elimination of noise, the omission of outliers, and so on.  Nor does the approach 
address the apparent fact that the background knowledge relative to which 
hypotheses are confirmed tends to be idealized.  But it explains the apparent fact 
that the incompatibility of some predictions of General Relativity and the 
Standard Model with available evidence does not disconfirm these theories.  It 
also helps to explain why some distorted hypotheses are not treated in the way 
that a thoroughly refuted theory is treated but instead as hypotheses with limited 
domains of applicability.  And it does all of this without appealing to ceteris-
paribus qualifiers or counterfactuals or similarity relations.   
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